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Book Reviews 
Picture Theory: Essays on Verbal and Visual Representation by W. j. T. Mitchell. 
Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1994. Pp. xv + 445. $34.95. 
Picture Theory might serve as a plump epitome of the Chicago mode of 
criticism: elaborate, comprehensive, painfully conscientious (in a footnote 
Mitchell thanks a friend for explaining the joke in a famous New Yorker car-
toon), and straining to articulate a theory that never quite crystallizes. Mitch-
ell proclaims early and late that "this is a book whose reach far outstrips its 
grasp" (8), an "incomplete project" (5), without "a visible architectonic" 
(417). Yet on page 100 he asserts "this book is ... a theory." His text, more-
over, is carefully divided into sections with structuring introductions a bit 
formal for a "collection of snapshots" (5), that he confesses may demonstrate 
only "why settled answers of a systematic kind" to what pictures are and 
how they relate to words "may be impossible," indeed, that he may have 
compiled an introduction to a discipline "that does not exist and never will" 
(7). What justifies these inconsistencies, along with the now commonplace 
practice of calling a "book" what is mostly a reprinting of essays and talks 
from a variety of diverse occasions, is a determination to be "theoretical." It 
is "theory," if only unachievable theory, that is satisfied with collecting snap-
shots rather than struggling to articulate a systematically developmental 
study-although some readers may be disappointed when a theory climaxes 
with so resounding an affirmation as "the inescapable heterogeniety of rep-
resentation" (418). 
Whether it is the tendency of theorizing to conclude in banality, or the dis-
ingenuousness of 1vfitchell's disclaimers, or another calise I haven't identi-
fied, something impedes the provocativeness Mitchell patently desires for 
Picture Theory. At least for someone like myself who for two decades has 
been teaching, thinking, and writing about relations of the verbal and the 
visual, Mitchell's contributions, although often in particulars sensible and in-
teresting, are seldom exciting. My sense of splashing about in shallow water 
may derive in part from the structuring of most of his essays as responses to 
what he rightly sees as unsatisfactory theorizing by other critics-with all 
the usual suspects rounded up. He justly conderuns, for example, the vapid 
Circularity of "interart" claims of Wendy Steiner, but does little himself to 
advance such undertakings. 
One reason he can't help me much appears in the chapter "Visible Lan-
guage: Blake's Art of Writing," an essentially unchanged reprint of a piece 
written over a decade ago-which means that it ignores the extraordinary 
transformation in Blakean scholarship of the past several years, especially 
historical analyses of Blake's engraving! etching practices, some important 
results of which have appeared in the splendid Princeton edition edited by 
Eaves, Essick, and Viscomi. That this elision of revisonary research is no ov-
ersight but a result of his methodology is displayed by Mitchell's positioning 
of Blake in opposition to what he terms "romantic antipictorialism." This, he 
claims, makes intelligible Blake's "graphocentrism" (117). But Mitchell's rep-
resentation of Jlromantic antipictorialismJl even he calls "a vast oversimplifi-
cation" (although one may suspect he underestimates how grossly he dis-
torts). He invokes, for example, Abrams's hoary mirror!Neoclassic-lamp! 
Romantic division in the Simplest possible way, ignoring how recent critics, 
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particularly those concerned with visual-verbal parallels, have been pointing 
out the many reflections and the few lamps appearing in romantic art. 
Mitchell further maintains, as if the romantic poets were followers of Pater, 
that they employ a "regular comparison of poetry with music" (117), which 
suggests he ought to reread, for starters, Wordsworth's Prefaces and Shel-
ley's Defence. Most striking, however, is Mitchell's complete disregard of the 
picturesque, that popular, infuriating, yet most revealing socia-artistic phe-
nomenon against which all the romantics, including Blake, at one time or 
another defined their artistic purposes and methods, verbal or visual. 
Such historical complexities are for Mitchell elidable, because what mat-
ters is a rhetorical structure provided by his "vast oversimplification" ena-
bling him to apply his "imagetext" theory to Blake's art. Mitchell's theoriz-
ing conunentary, despite re-raising one or two potentially interesting ideas, 
such as the possible importance of Blake's pictured scrolls, mystifies central 
issues because it distorts the complicated evolution of Blake's art over a very 
long career. Mitchell casually leaps, for instance, from the illustrations of Job 
in the late 1820s back to Songs of Innocence of 1789, forward to Jerusalem, then 
back to The Marriage of Heaven and Hell of the early 1790s. It is as if a Shakes-
peareian critic h'eated The Tempest and The Comedy of Errors as interchange-
able-only worse, because the now well-documented changes in Blake's pur-
poses and practices of designing, printing, and coloring of his "illumina-
tions" are supposed to be Mitchell's principal concern. This indifference to 
specific processes of historical evolution is accentuated by slurrings and 
blurrings in Mitchell's interpretations. The writing of Jerusalem, he tells us, 
Blake offers as "on the same level as the writing of the Ten Commandments 
on Mt. Sinai"-which seems dubious in the light of Blake's consistent atti-
tude toward those commandments beginning with The Marriage of Heaven 
and Hell, Plates 22-24). Or, to return once more to a problem of "imagetext," 
Mitchell insists on the importance of Innocence being "printed in Roman/' 
whereas Experience is "printed in italic," and he goes on to refer to "roman 
print" and "italic print." Blake of course printed whole plates: what we see is 
italic script or roman script-both are equaly calligraphic. The possible con-
fusion may be trivial, yet symptomatic: Mitchell's imposition of ahistorical 
theory about Blake and books leads him to ignore what scholars as diverse 
as Darnton and Viscomi have been demonstrating as to how the "book" was 
conceived and how it functioned socially at the end of the eighteenth-cen-
tury. (An obverse and equally trivial but symptomatic detail is Mitchell's 
change of an original essay in which he oversimplified the title of Malevich's 
famous painting Painterly Realism: Boy with Knapsack-Color Masses in the 
Fourth Dimension; his claim (226) that HLis is a "new" title for Suprematist 
Composition: Red Square and Black Square arises from his need to justify his 
anecdote of viewing the painting, but at the cost of probably misleading 
readers as to which was the picture's original title.) 
It makes me uncomfortable to write this way of someone with whom my 
relations-until now-have been amicable, and ordinarily I would not 
bother. Shoddy work in our profession normally sinks quickly to its appro-
priate level. But Mitchell is the editor of a distinguished journal. If humanis-
tic studies are through self-debasing practices losing esteem both among 
other academics and the general public, established professors bear the re-
r 
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sponsibility of rigorously sustaining the credibility of scholarship. There is 
lavish docmentation in this book, but too much of it rings of merely politic 
citation. One notices that almost never does Mitchell display the true schol-
ar's fascination with the sources of the sources he cites. One can forgive an 
assistant professor writing hyperbolically under the insane pressure created 
by contemporary theorizers to produce spectacular originality, but it is de-
pressing when someone in Mitchell's position writes, "I know it is heresy to 
suggest that Blake could have held any reactionary opinions" (123), the ab-
surdity of the claim in 1994 advertising the intensity of his desire to be seen 
as "heretical." In fact, officials who rely on the usual suspects are seldom 
heretics of any kind. 
It is a relief, then, to turn to another inadequacy in Mitchell's theory of vis-
ual representation, because this is one of which I too am guilty. Mitchell, like 
most literary critics, is fundamentally insensitive to what goes into the mak-
ing of pictorial artistry. It is not merely that, as often been said, a writer 
moves from concept to percept while a visual artist moves from percept to 
concept, but also that visual artistry depends on hand skills, so that evalua-
tions of finished works ought not to be separated from awareness of proc-
esses of material production. My awareness of my own incompetence as a 
commentator on visual art originated in overhearing the muttered exclama-
tion of my painter companion close to a picture in a gallery we were visiting: 
"Now why the hell did he use that kind of oil?" 
The need for a sensitivity Mitchell and I lack (along with a surprising 
number of art historians, it must be said) is dramatized by Tolstoy'S descrip-
tion of the painter Mihailov in Anna Karenina, who recovers a sketch from his 
little daughter and finds it stained by candle grease. Reworking his sketch, 
he discovers that the grease spot has revealed the correct pose of a figure he 
had previously struggled in vain to draw. Literary critics may not like it, but 
this kind of physical II accident" is central to visual art. Good criticism of it 
ought to begin in an interest in how artifacts are made, what they are made 
of, and what physically happened in the creating of them. I think the weak-
ness of Mitchell's discussions not merely of well-known paintings, and his 
chapter on the works of Robert Morris, but even his comments on books of 
photographs and movies such as Do The Right Thing and JFK, are disappoint-
ing, despite some judicious specific observations, because Mitchell has no in-
terest in making processes. He is in this deficiency, I repeat, not unique: too 
many film commentators, for example, are unconcerned with what strikes 
me as the weird-virtually unbelievable-fashion in which movies are con-
structed. If Heidegger was right, that only in painting are the full realities of 
colors realized, even as only in sculpture do the genuine qualities of stone 
appear, one must be suspicious of any theorist of visual representation indif-
ferent to its intrinsic physicalities. 
Even more debilitating, but more surprising, is Mitchell's omission of any 
reference to orality. Granting that contemporary culture is intensely textual 
(as well as visual), it seems odd to relate verbal and visual without admit-
ting that the verbal originates as sound, an aural-invisible-phenomenon. 
In the past dozen years, moreover, there has been intense study of oral liter-
atures which should be brought into play here. One may think of scholars 
like Ong and Goody, but even a critic such as Bakhtin (whom Mitchell also 
340 Criticism, Vol. XXXVI!, No.2: Book Reviews 
ignores), although primarily concerned with the novel, has commented co-
gently; for instance, on the relevant problem in written texts of intonation. 
The problem is that there is no human speech not characterized by specific-
ity of intonations which, exactly because they are not "visible" in a written 
text, become interpretive foci in fiction. 
The paradox I'm left with is that, although Mitchell speaks frequently of 
the difficulty of addressing in language the problem of systematically defin-
ing the essence of visual representation, the effect of his determination al-
ways to theorize at whatever cost is to diminish belief in his recognition of 
the most intractable difficulties in his project. He sees his own principal con-
tribution as an emphasis on what he calls imagetext, recognition that all pic-
torializations are infected with verbal meanings, and that all writing must be 
perceived as containing a pictorial element. True enough, yet this hardly 
launches us into intellectual deep water, espeCially when unsupported by 
eager breadth of scholarly awareness, despite heavy footnoting and massive 
listing of acknowledgments. Notably absent from Mitchell's usual suspects, 
to cite one telling example, is Meyer Schapiro, whose old essay "Some Prob-
lems in the Semiotics of Visual Art: Field and Vehicle in Image-Signs" hap-
pens to have been reprinted just last year. This essay with the modestly ele-
gant specificity of exemplary scholarship illuminatingly explores several of 
the basic problems of representation which provoke Mitchell's most labori-
ous manipulation of abstractions. 
No doubt my dissatisfactions reveal more about my Alzheimerish incapac-
ity to appreciate the dominant style of contemporary academic criticism than 
about what for some readers will seem Picture Theory's accomplishments. I 
speak with confidence of my limitations, because when struggling in Chap-
ter Ten with Mitchell's relentless schematizings about illusion, I found my 
mind strangely drifting back to a pre-World War I! Charlie Chan movie, in 
which I remember the Swedish actor who gave a sort of illusion of a pseudo-
Chinese detective observing in his characteristically fake Confucian manner: 
"Theory like mist on eyeglasses. Obscure facts." 
Columbia University Karl Kroeber 
The Imprint of Gender: Authorship and Publication in the English Renaissance by 
Wendy Wall. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993. Pp. xii + 373. $42.95, 
cloth; $17.95, paper. 
This is a simply extraordinary first book: its scope and detail are most im-
pressive, as it raises questions about authorship, technology, genre, gender, 
class, and politics, while dealing with a number of canonical and noncanoni-
cal texts written at a liminal moment in the history of English literature. It is 
the time when manuscript circulation of poems and other forms of writing, 
with its collective or anonymous creators, was challenged by the existence of 
print, the possibility of fixing and monumentalizing a text by a single au-
thor. 
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Scholars have discussed "the stigma of print," deeply felt by Shakespeare's 
contemporaries, for almost fifty years, but it has remained for our time to 
investigate the two cultures----manuscript circulation and print-seriously. It 
would have been difficult to get New Critics, with their reverence for the 
single-authored text, closely read, and the imperative to publish or perish in 
the great graduate schools of America, to believe an age in which the social 
transactions that attended a poem were more important to its author than 
the work itself. But now that the author has dwindled into the author func-
tion, books are seen as commodities, and all have audiences who read from 
different positions, the issues that Wall addresses are not only thinkable, but 
fascinating. It is characteristic of Wall's scholarship that she refers to J. W. 
Saunders' article written in 1951, instead of citing just the latest thing from 
the new historicists. Her introduction is a full history of how the questions 
she addresses and how the approaches she uses have developed in the last 
half century. That practice is carried throughout with scrupulous ci!ation of 
an enormous body of scholarship. 
The class and gender politics of the manuscript-print culture are relatively 
simple: the pen is virginal and aristocratic; print is promiscuous and vulgar. 
Printing one's works becomes therefore metaphorically public wantoness, a 
transgressive act that needed to be negotiated with various strategies. One 
was to make sonnet sequences into books to be read as they were circulated 
in coteries, as conversations with participation of lover and beloved, as part 
of labyrinthine ways of courtship, instead of a clear narrative development. 
Printed books retained the trappings of manuscripts. They became pseudo-
morphs or books which seemed like manuscripts until the authors assumed 
sufficient authority to become men in print. 
The sonnet cycles also placed the reader in the position of the voyeur in 
relation to the text, a position that suits perfectly the gendered rhetoric of 
male authors about their printed texts: the text is female; the reader and 
writer, male. Thus, Renaissance publishing is constructed as an enticing and 
dangerous cultural event, also one in which the male author risks effemini-
zation, as his text is associated with fallen women. 
Wall shows how Spenser and Gascoigne used the The Shepherd's Calendar 
and A Hundreth Sundrie Flowres to impersonate manuscripts early in their ca-
reers, and then went on to claim authority in later works. Daniel and Lodge 
use the complaint, joined to a sonnet sequence: they adopt the very voice of 
the fallen woman, thereby dislocating gender and blending genres. But all 
these transitions are negotiated; few took the way of Ben Jonson, to assert 
authority in print for the most scorned of genres, popular plays. 
Wall shows, however, how another aristocratic genre, the pageant, when it 
is printed, extends its theatricality because what was improvised is in-
scribed. She demonstrates how two of Elizabeth's courtiers, Sidney and Gas-
coigne, attempted to coerce their sovereign to take stances favorable to the 
author's politics. Both failed, and so the author's intent in the pageant was 
foiled. 111en the hoped-for outcome became more securely fixed by the au-
thor in print-and certainly monumentalized in the apparatus of the book. 
Moreover, print brought with it many more claims of bringing immortality 
to an author and to his subject/ object. 
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If men were ashamed to seek print, women would bring upon themselves 
double shame to publish their work during the Renaissance. Women's nego-
tiations took very conservative forms in this period: mothers published lega-
cies to their children. Mary Sidney, countess of Pembroke, published certain 
translations, but never her psalms, which she did prepare to present to the 
queen at court. Aemelia Lanyer published Salve Deus Rex Judaeorum in 1611, 
imitating some of Sidney's strategies for making her work public. Another 
member of the Sidney clan, Lady Mary Wroth, used the strategy of making 
the author of her sonnet sequence a fiction from Urania. Each female author 
sought her own negotiation within the very narrow band of orthodox behav-
ior. 
One learns so much from this book, it seems churlish to criticize, but that 
is the task of the reviewer. There is more redundancy in the writing than 
necessary. The arguments are complex and very well developed. But conclu-
sions are repeated a bit too often. The two chapters on the sonnet sequences 
probably should have been brought together, where the separate points still 
could have been clearly made, always granting that both points about the 
sequences are extremely valuable. In reading a really good book, one always 
ends lusting for more; so I will conclude with gratitude for the smart and 
provocative book that Wendy Wall has given us. 
Wayne State University Marilyn L. Williamson 
Shepheards Devises: Edmund Spenser's Shepheardes Calender and the Institu-
tions of Elizabeth Society by Robert Lane. Athens, Georgia: University of Geor-
gia Press, 1993. pp. x + 240. $40.00. 
The first thing to be noted about Robert Lane's study is that it pays only 
fleeting attention to The Faerie Queene. Although not explicitly stated by 
Lane, it soon becomes apparent that he is not interested in tracing the move-
ment of the earlier Shepheardes Calender (1579) to the later Faerie Queene (1592) 
as the Virgilian progression from eclogue to epic. Lane is engaged in a rigor-
ous application of an historicist method that examines the material condi-
tions involved in the production and reception of the Shepheardes Calender. 
He argues that Spenser's pastoral poem be seen as a radical, oppositionist 
work that critiques the "regime" of Elizabeth and two hierarchical institu-
tions of Elizabethan society, the Church and Court. He sets his work against 
analyses of the poem that are concerned with seeing the Shepheardes Calender 
as inaugurating what has been called the English Renaissance and those 
which, through an appropriation of biographical material, envision Spenser 
as the poor scholar at Cambridge, engaged in a lifelong quest to ingratiate 
himself, through his literary talent, into the patronage circles of an Elizabe-
than court. He positions his historicist methodology against analyses of the 
Calender that treat the aesthetic as a transcendent category, even when it is 
considered as historically contingent, as in the recent work of Paul Alpers 
("Pastoral and the Domain of Lyric in Spenser's Shepheardes Calender," Repre-
sentations 12 [1985]) and Nancy Jo Hoffroan (Spenser's Pastorals: "The She-
-1 
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pheardes Calender" and "Colin Clout" [Baltimore: Johns HOpkins University 
Press, 1977]). He also opposes the type of contextualist analysis of the Calen-
der concerned with the author's biography or with a topical approach to the 
allegory of the poem that attempts to assign one-to-one correspondences be-
tween Spenser's shepherds and real historical personages. Referring specifi-
cally to Paul McLane (Spenser's "Shepheardes Calender": A Study in Elizabethan 
Allegory [Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1961]), Lane 
cites Louis Montrose in calling this kind of investigation literary "detective 
work" (Sn.). 
After dismissing formalist and old-historicist criticisms of Spenser's poem 
quite early in the book, Lane engages recent new historicist work, particu-
larly Stephen Greenblatt's assertion that subversion is always contained and 
is, in fact, created by the dominant ideology to legitimate its own entrenched 
power. However useful the new historicist project has been as a palliative to 
the shortcomings of formalist and old-historicist criticisms, Lane criticizes it 
for assuming "a status that elides human initiation, rendering social phe-
nomena as the impersonal operation of social or linguistic entities such as 
'power' or 'discursive fields' and society itself, finally, as a monolithic struc-
ture in which all differences (especially political resistance) tum out to be 
only incidental variants of a single imperative" (7). Above all, it is human 
agency that Lane wants to reclaim for Spenser, and his project thus becomes 
one of demonstrating that Spenser responds to the circulating discourses of 
Elizabethan ideology and challenges that ideology by "using the same re-
sources it draws on to reach very different conclusions" (74). 
It is, of course, impossible in this space to delineate the very thorough ar-
gument Lane elaborates to support these "different conclusions," but a brief 
example should suffice to give a sense of the way he proceeds. During Eliza-
beth's reign, there was an elaborate image constructed around the Queen as 
the "mother" of England. This Umother" image and its association with 
"motherly care" was appropriated by Spenser and used to criticize Eliza-
beth's regime in two of the eclogues. In the April eclogue, Lane finds a jar-
ring, discordant note, in what is generally considered to be a panegyric to 
Elizabeth, in the reference to Niobe: "Niobe's combined role as mother and 
political ruler has affinities with that other metaphor so familiar to Spenser's 
readers, of the queen as mother of England and its people as her children" 
(IS). The fact that Phoebus and Cynthia, "Latonaes seede," tum Niobe into 
stone because of her excessive pride serves to undermine the ostenSibly lau-
datory and celebratory tone of the eclogue. In the May eclogue, the meta-
phor of motherly care is deflated in the fables of a mother goat who aban-
dons her kid for the pursuit of pleasure, unrealistically expecting admonition 
to serve in place of education, and the mother ape who inadvertently suffo-
cates her "youngling" in a desire to embrace him too closely. Lane engages 
in similar procedures to demonstrate, successfully I think, that Spenser criti-
cized the Church and Court as well. The picture of Spenser that emerges is 
consistently one of political resistance. 
As further evidence of the Cale11der's subversive nature, Lane cites the 
poem's dedication to Sidney (who incurred, in 1579, the disfavor of the 
Queen for advising her against her impending marriage to the due d'-
Alen~on) and its publication by Hugh Singleton, John Stubbs's printer 
I 
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(Stubbs forfeited his right hand for publicly doing, in his pamphlet, The Gap-
ing Gulf, what Sidney had done in a private letter). Lane also argues that the 
calendrical form itself-like broadsides and ballads, generally considered a 
popular medium-and the use of woodcuts to introduce each eclogue for the 
benefit of the illiterate mark the poem as an oppositionist work directed to a 
broad audience. Recognizing the populist appeal of the Calender forces us to 
relinquish the notion that it was written only for courtly aristocrats. 
Lane suggests that in the highly-charged political atmosphere of 1579 
Spenser had to protect himself from the retribution the Calender's associa-
tions with political resistance might have incited. Spenser does this by em-
ploying several devices that enable the poem to engage in political commen-
tary while protecting its author from censorship: the poem's anonymity; 
commentary of "E.K.," whose reticence or misdirection in glossing certain 
passages acts as a signpost to the reader that politically controversial issues 
are being addressed; the use of fable as a cultural commonplace in political 
critique; and the dialogic structure of the eclogue itself. It might be argued 
that the cumulative effect of this extensive filtering of Spenser's political cri-
tique is to dull the point Lane makes about Spenser as an agent for change. 
It might also be argued that Spenser adopts literary pastoralism as a way to 
express sanctioned dissent in order to legitimate hierarchical structures. In 
response Lane insists that layers of ambiguity for warding off censorship 
were made necessary by repressive Elizabethan institutions, and populist 
audiences would have read through the ambiguity, conceiving the pastoral 
eclogue as a genre appropriate for voicing real dissent. 
Lane reopens the familiar conflict between cultural materialism and new 
historicism about the scope of human agency by refuting the new-historicist 
description of the function of literary pastoralism. George Puttenham ob-
serves that "The Poet devised the Eglogue ... not of purpose to counterfait 
or represent the rusticall manner of loves and communication, but under the 
vaile of homely persons and in rude speeches to insinuate and glaunce at 
greater matters, and such as perchance had not bene safe to have beene dis-
closed in any other sort." This suggests that the pastoral eclogue was widely 
recognized as embodying political critique, and the absence of any system-
atic crackdown on the authors of pastoral eclogues, by the persons or institu-
tions criticized, implies that pastoral eclogue may have functioned in the 
service of the dominant culture, a function best described by Montrose: "The 
primarily courtly pastoral of the Renaissance puts into playa symbolic strat-
egy, which, by reconstituting the leisured gentleman as the gentle shepherd, 
obfuscates a fundamental contradiction in the cultural logic: a contradiction 
between the secular claims of aristocratic prerogative and the religious 
claims of common origins, shared fallenness, and spiritual equality among 
men, gentle and base alike" ("Of Gentlemen and Shepherds: The Politics of 
Elizabethan Pastoral Form," ELH 50 [1983]: 432). Subversive religious egali-
tarianism, which might have been used politically to oppose aristocratic 
privilege, was supposedly defused in the literary pastoral world by poets 
whose very participation in the courtly genre of the pastoral eclogue asso-
ciated them with the aristocracy. 
In his analysis of the September eclogue, Lane offers a different descrip-
tion of the function of the pastoral in poetry. He sees Diggon Davie's reports 
-n# 
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of his travels as registering real complaints about "the changing structure of 
agrarian relations" (1). Davie's descriptions of "missing chimneys and live-
stock converted into cash-evoke issues that arose from the transformation 
of the countryside by the commercialization of agriculture" (1-2). More im-
portantly and in direct opposition to Montrose, Lane says the September ec-
logue "incorporates the voices of those we do not expect to find in poetry-
'the people: the nonelite of Elizabethan society. Their presence here disturbs 
any simple identification between serious poetry and a courtly elite or an 
aristocratic perspective" (2). This concept of the pastoral is not particular to 
the September eclogue; it extends to the Calender in general. Spenser's shep-
herds are not the literary manifestation of leisured gentlemen, but the voice 
of the rustic poor, registering complaints about Elizabethan institutions. 
In response to Montrose's argument, in '''Eliza, Queene of shepheardes,' 
and the Pastoral of Power" (ELR 10 [1980]: 163), that the pastoral served the 
interests of the hierarchical social order, Lane suggests that "Spenser was 
opposing himself (if only prophetically) to the mainstream of Elizabethan 
pastoral" and "the Calender stands as a dramatic exception to this claim" 
(83). It is stimulating to see the Calender as an exception, to see Spenser mak-
ing his literary debut as a radical critic of the established order, and Lane 
makes it possible to do just that. Lane says that his "work emphasizes social 
and political institutions and practices because their elucidation is necessary 
for an understanding of the Calender, but those dynamics were registered 
and mediated-whether wholly consciously or not-by a writer we know as 
Edmund Spenser. None of that social experience, or the cultural resources he 
brought to bear on it in this poem, originated with him, but he perceived it, 
worked to understand it, and responded to it, crafting its articulation in or-
der to communicate it-to represent it-in a particular way, all with a view 
toward reshaping the society of which those dynamics were constituent ele-
ments" (7). He thus provides a way to accommodate cultural-materialist 
claims for human agency to new-historicist claims that discursive fields cre-
ate and contain that agency. 
Wayne State University Tim Montbriand 
The Snowflake on the Belfty: Dogma and Disquietude in the Critical Arena by 
Anna Balakian. BlOOmington: Indiana University Press, 1994. Pp. xiv + 270. 
$39.95. 
This important collection of 19 essays includes a series of lectures that Ba-
lakian gave during a 3-week appointment as Visiting Fellow at the Institute 
for the Humanities of Indiana University. The subject of these essays is Ba-
lakian's judicious commentary and captivating thoughts on the relatively re-
cent developments in the Held of literary criticism, developments that in-
clude deconstruction, post-structuralism, multiculturalism, and other literary 
approaches that have insisted on adhering to political agendas and radical 
ideologies. VVhat Balakian strives to do in these discussions is not so much to 
debate the validity of the politics or the ideological soundness of the meth-
I' 
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ods in question, but for the most part simply to examine systematically the 
effects that these radical methods have had on the classroom teaching and 
study of literature. 
There is probably no one better qualified than Anna Balakian to take up 
the heated debate that is now raging ill academic departments of literature, 
most particularly in departments of comparative literature, where the new 
methodologies have been embraced with the greatest enthusiasm. Balakian 
is famous for her extensive and ground-breaking studies on surrealism and 
symbolism, and she can boast of having rubbed elbows with some of the 
great artistic and literary legends of our time. Her book, Literanj Origins of 
Surrealism, first published in 1947, includes a frontispiece that is an original 
drawing by Yves Tanguy, which he created for her book at the end of his life 
while reSiding in COlmecticut. Balakian personally interviewed Andre Breton 
in his Greenwich Village apartment in New York City during h.is self-im-
posed exile of World War II. Her long career as a scholar and professor of 
comparative literature has given her a unique perspective on the vicissitudes 
and the cataclysmic changes that have been wrought in the past few decades 
in the area of literary criticism. In short, she is one of few scholars who have 
the credentials and the experience, not to mention the courage, to take on a 
debate that for many is just too fraught with political contentiousness. She 
has entered into the literary fracas as a calm, level-headed, and shrewd ob-
server, from whom we have much to learn. 
In these essays, as Balakian questions the veracity of Derrida, Foucault, 
Lacan, and others, she persuasively argues that the faddish popularity of 
these ideologues has now established a stranglehold on academic depart-
ments of literature that has done little to enhance the canon or the curricu-
lum, and perhaps has done much to cause damage. In her introductory es-
say, "By Way of Entry into the Fray: 111e Critics and Their Authors," Ba-
lakian chronicles the first stirrings of her alarm in April 1970, while 
attending a colloquium on the new novel in Strasbourg, France. There she 
heard a struchlralist, whose name she does not give, but to whom she refers 
as "the man in the dark glasses," declare that there was no such thing as an 
author, that there was only writing, and that the literary work has written it-
self using the author only as a medium. Thus, the reception of a literary text 
by the reader gained paramount importance, and the aesthetic value of the 
text as carefully crafted by the author was of almost no importance. To Ba-
bkian's horror, no one contested the arguments of the structuralist at the col-
loquium, who \vas allowed to voice his comments after every paper, and 
there seemed to be palpable a general air of defeat among many of the par-
ticipants. In this short but powerful introductory essay, Balakian establishes 
her deep reservations, and for the rest of the book she effectively refutes "the 
man in the dark glasses." 
The question of aesthetics is examined again in more depth in the essay, 
"The Snowfbkc on the Belfry: The Aesthetic Dimension in Literary Criti-
cism." Balakian chastises the critics of the new methodologies for flagrantly 
ignoring the aesthetic dimension of the literary text. The belief in the exag-
geratcd importance of the reader in the reception of the text, \vhich strips the 
tc'd of its personal PZlst and forces it to be regarded as a product of a collec-
ti\'t.~ unconscious, is one to be yiewed with suspicion. Not only is the author 
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disowned, but the author's personal style has ceased to be a factor in the aes-
thetic value of the literary work. After unloading the aesthetic baggage, the 
semiologist can presumably view the text in its raw linguistic state, conduct-
ing a scientific investigation of its cornmon denominators, which approaches, 
as Balakian notes, "the type of knowledge one can glean from myth, arche-
types, or paradigms" (15). Divested of its aesthetic value, Balakian wonders 
if the literary text is not being treated in much the same way as a social doc-
ument that merely presents information. She also comments that the attempt 
to nullify the unique history of the literary text, as well as that of the author, 
results in nothing less than an attempt "to undermine Western culture by 
deleting the validity of its referential role in literature" (19). 
In the essay entitled "Multiculturalism: The Case of Surrealism/' Balakian 
describes a form of multiculturalism that is different from the one presently 
being touted in academia. Using surrealism as her example, she di.scusses 
the history of an international literary movement that included both familiar 
and unfamiliar literatures, and that strove to stress what was common to all 
the national literatures rather than what was different. This successful strug-
gle to universalize a literary movement was based on international commu-
nism and spread to nearly every part of the globe. Balakian points out the 
multiplicity of nationalities among some noted surrealists: the Czech Vite-
slav Nezval, the Yugoslav Marco Ristich, the Swede Max Walter Svanberg, 
and the Japanese Takiguchi, among others, including the many surrealists of 
Latin America, where the movement had its most electrifying effect. She 
notes how the fraternal and unifying forces of the surrealist brand of multi-
culturalism were much different from the divisive forces of the current 
brand, where one sees" abject chauvinism, with each subculture fighting for 
its day in the sun" (131). 
In her last three essays, "Quality Control in the Teaching of Literature," 
"Canon Harassment," and "Literary Theory and Comparative Uterature/' 
Balakian sums up her concerns about the sometimes paralyzing effects of the 
new methods and ideologies on the classroom teaching of literature and the 
classroom curriculum. She reiterates her concern about aesthetics; she ques-
tions the wisdom of using the tools of the anthropologist and the sociologist 
for the analysis of literary texts; she is disturbed by the contrived manipula-
tion of the traditional canon; and she voices her uneasiness about the unclear 
definition of "influence," fearing that influence studies may be replaced by 
studies of intertextuality, and studies of literary fortune may be replaced by 
reader reception theories. 
There is undoubtedly much here to argue about, to debate, to consider 
and reconsider. But it is important that this alternate viewpoint become 
more widely disseminated, that the voice of doubt be heard in literature de-
partments across the continent. It is probably safe to say that this book is 
mandatory reading for anyone who has ever taught literature in the college 
classroom and for anyone who has ever seriously studied it. 
Montreal, Quebec Clarise Samuels 
I 
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Foregone Conclusions: Against Apocalyptic History by Michael Andre Bernstein. 
Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1994, Pp. xiii 
+ 181. $22.00. 
Michael Andre Bernstein proposes a theory of reading that celebrates " ... 
the radical freedom of human beings from any kind of determinism" (1). 
This "radical freedom" is achieved by substituting the practice of "sidesha-
dowing" for "foreshadowing" as a method of reading texts and the-world-
as-text. Sideshadowing is ". . . a gesturing to the side, to a present dense 
with multiple, and mutually exclusive, possibilities for what is to come .... 
Sideshadowing stresses the significance of random, haphazard, and unassi-
milable contingencies, and instead of the power of the system to uncover an 
otherwise unfathomable truth, it expresses the ever-changing nature of that 
truth and the absence of any predictive certainties in human affarrs" (1, 4). 
The theory is a combination of soft deconstructionism in literature and wa-
tered down Emersonism as applied to life. Truth is not non-existent, only re-
lentlessly fluid, and life, if not a bowl of cherries, is at least a cornucopia of 
infinite possibilities. In an essay published seventy years before Bernstein's 
book, T. E. Hulme discussed the romantic and classical views of human 
beings by saying that, "To the one party man's nature is like a well, to the 
other like a bucket. The view which regards man as a well, a reservoir full of 
possibilities, I call the romantic; the one which regards him as a very finite 
and fixed creature, I call the classical." Bernstein's theory clearly places him 
among those who advocate the romantic view. 
Bernstein's decision to use the Holocaust as a test case for his theory of a 
radical freedom achieved by viewing the world through sideshadowing 
lenses constitutes another instance of the recent tendency by deconstruction-
ists in academia to co-opt the Holocaust. Bernstein is not unaware of poten-
tial difficulties: "To have chosen to confront the claims of sideshadowing 
with the enormity of the Shoah," he writes, "is to test it against a seemingly 
intractable counter-instance, on the principle that if the validity of sidesha-
dowing can be discerned here, where it seems so difficult to recognize, then 
its pertinence in cases that are not as morally and theoretically arduous will 
be more readily apparent" (13-14). 
Awareness of potential difficulties, however, does not enable Bernstein to 
recognize his own offense in the clause, "to confront the claims of sidesha-
dowing with the enormity of the Shoah," his academic vanity preventing 
him from recognizing the parodic grotesquerie of setting the scientistic aca-
demic coinage uSideshadowing" alongside what was once an emotive phrase 
but has now become an academic cliche, "enormity of the Shoah." Bern-
stein's trivialization is all the more ironic in that he later observes that " . .. it 
is all too easy to think of representations of the Shoah whose lapses into 
tastelessness and exploitation are deeply offensive, and which, in their vul-
garity, risk coarsening the collective memory" (52). The beam in one's own 
eye is indeed difficult to detect. 
Bernstein's claim to be conducting an experiment in which he tests the 
"claims of sideshadowing" against "the enormity of the Shoah" is doubly 
disingenuous. First, the claim is diSingenuous because we know all along 
that Bernstein is not testing anything at all. We know the "seemingly intract-
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able counter-instance" will have to yield to "the claims of sideshadowing:' 
because all Bernstein has to do to make the one yield to the other is manipu-
late words in the requisite way. Secondly, the claim is disingenuous because 
Bernstein is actually using "sideshadowing" and the Holocaust to promote 
the underlying political agenda of discrediting Zionism as a totalizing ideol-
ogy by establishing the claim that "Zionism" has perverted the Holocaust to 
its own narrow nationalist needs. Since so many Israelis are Holocaust survi-
vors and children of survivors, the symbiosis between Israel and the Holo-
caust is extremely complex and emotionally wrenching. I cannot possibly 
deal with such complexities in the space allotted here, but the point is that 
Bernstein does not deal with them in his book either. He presents a ridicu-
lously simplistic scenario in which "Zionist ideology" exploits the victim-
hood of the victims for one set of purposes and the heroism of the Jewish re-
sistance fighters for another set of purposes. Though the question of the rela-
tionship of the Israeli present to the Holocaust past has been the subject of 
innumerable discussions in the Israeli press and Israeli journals, Bernstein 
develops his two-pronged Zionist/Holocaust agenda on the basis of only a 
few second hand academic articles, and never deals with a single original 
source. 
It would be impossible to unpack all of the complex issues that Bernstein 
has presented in simplistic terms, but I would like to address myself to two 
specific issues he raises. The first issue is the representation of Jewish resis-
tance movements under Nazi occupation, and may be called a problema tics 
of reality and imagination. The second is the fictional representation of the 
Holocaust by a survivor, and may be called a problematics of literature and 
history. 
In highly oversimplified terms, Bernstein presents the image of a Zionist 
ideology that sought to foster the myth of the fighting Jew in the Israeli 
imagination by narratizing and commemorating Jewish resistance move-
ments during the Holocaust as clearly motivated heroic acts. "Thus," he 
writes "the fighters of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising, or of the Sobibor and 
Birkenau revolts, have become crucial in the post-war Jewish, and more par-
ticularly, in the Israeli imagination, as proof of a new Jewish readiness to 
strike back against their oppressors." In a SCholarly book dealing with a topic 
as widely discussed as the place of Jewish resistance movements in the Is-
raeli imagination, we would expect the author to supply supporting evi-
dence, and to discuss psychological, sociological, and historical studies, as 
well as journals, diaries, and literary accounts, SUd1 as novels, poems, and 
stories about Jewish uprisings that reflect this allegedly crucial influence on 
the Israeli imagination. But in support of his all-encompassing claim, Bern-
stein cites only one gossipy comment from a secondary essay. 
Bernstein next undertakes to undermine the Zionist myth of heroic Jewish 
resistance by deconstructing the actual uprisings. "Like the plot of a classical 
tragedy," he writes, 
U,e uprisings against the Nazis took place in a restricted space and 
time, and the fighters seem tragically heroic to us because we know 
how they perished and Ums we can grasp the beginning and end of 
each uprising as a single event, fixed in a clear progression of linked 
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episodes. But while it was actually happening, it was experienced in-
stant by instant and person by person, each with different motives and 
inspirations for fighting, and each with differently formulated explana-
tions of his own involvement. 
Since Bernstein attributes so much importance to narrative strategiesf one 
would have expected him to specify which narratives he feels have misre-
presented Jewish uprisings in tragic-heroic terms. But haVing suggested that 
Jewish Resistance narratives misrepresent what actually happened, he does 
not cite a single mythologizing narrative, nor a single first-hand narrative, 
nor a single account by a historian of Jewish resistance movements (such as 
Shmuel Krakowski, Nechama Tec, Aaron Nirensztein). 
In fact, the uprisings were not as unmotivated as Bernstein claims. Histori-
cally, there were often several (but far from infinite) motivating factors hotly 
debated among and within resistance groups: namely, whether their primary 
goal should be to save as many Jews as possible, to avenge the wanton mur-
der of Jews by killing Germans, or to save Jewish honor by fighting in a bat-
tle the fighters knew they had no hope of winning, just to show that all Jews 
did not go "like sheep to the slaughter." A historian of the Krakow Ghetto 
Resistance, Aaron Nirensztein, cites testimony that there was a split between 
two factions in the Akiva Resistance Movement in the Krakow Ghetto. One 
faction held that" . . . we must use our resources to rescue as many of our 
people as possible," while a second maintained that ", .. our resources are so 
meager and trivial, that what we have to do above all else is to save Jewish 
honor, to fight for the sake of fighting, and to die as heroes."! Another histo-
rian of Jewish resistance movements, Shmuel Krakowski, writes of the War-
saw Ghetto uprising that "It was understood that this would be a special 
kind of revolt.. It was necessary to prepare for an uprising that was 
doomed to defeat from its onset. ... "2 
As to Bemsein's contention that "while it was actually happening, it was 
experienced instant by instant and person by person, each with different mo-
tives and inspirations for fighting, and each with differently formulated ex-
planations of his own involvement," to the extent that no mo individuals 
are perfectly identical, the deconstructionist description may be accurate. But 
the implication that the fighters were unmotivated particles floating in space 
is existentially and historically false, and is sharply contradicted by Gusta 
Davidson Draenger, a resistance fighter in the Krakow Ghetto, in her Pa-
mientnik JIIstyny (Justyna's Dian;), written in 1943, while the struggle was still 
taking place.3 Gusta reproduces a Sabbath-evening speech by one of the 
leaders of the Resistance, Adolph Liebeskind, in which he tells the young 
people assembled around him (most in their teens): "We're on a one-way 
journey with no return. The road we've chosen to travel is the road to death. 
Remember that. Anybody who joined us in the hope of improving his 
chances of survival should know that's not what we're about." Liebeskind's 
idealistic fatalism is a far cry from Bernstein's armchair theorizingl For the 
Jewish resistance fighters in the Krakow Ghetto, the sideshadowed "present 
dense with multiple, and mutually exclusive, possibilities for what is to 
come" would have been a grotesque joke. The point is, that Bernstein's con-
tention that the Jewish Resistance movements have been mythified is worth-
. 
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less because he takes no pains whatever to establish a "historical reality" 
that would undermine the alleged myth. 
But what may be most disturbing in Bernstein's formulation is that in "a-
tomizing" the Resistance fighters to promote his political agenda, he not only 
deconstructs their identities as individuals, but also removes the possibility 
of making any moral distinctions. Consider a re-narratizing of Bernstein's 
story line that would re-arrange some of the nouns to read as follows: 
Like the plot of a classical tragedy, the "aktzias" against the Jews took 
place in a restricted space and time, and the SS troopers seem diaboli-
cally evil to us because we know how they murdered their victims and 
thus we can grasp the begirming and end of each aktzia as a single 
event, fixed in a clear progression of linked episodes. But while it was 
actually happening, it was experienced instant by instant and person 
by person, each with different motives and inspirations for murdering 
victims, and each with differently formulated explanations of his own 
involvement. 
The narrative atomization of the human form that Bernstein engages in to 
deconstruct the "Zionist mythology" of the Jewish resistance fighters, and to 
remove any sense of tragedy from their plight, equally removes all moral re-
sponsibility from the SS men who were committing mass murder for the 
sake of insuring racial purity. If the Jewish resistance fighters were merely 
unmotivated particles engaged in a random series of contingent acts, then so 
were the murderers. All behavior, then, is contingent, non-motivated, and 
immune to moral assessment. Non-determined (unforeshadowed) Jew parti-
cles and non-determined SS particles happened to float into the same space 
and the Jew particles disappeared. 
Having disregarded historical texts and all first-hand accounts in his theo-
rizing about the Holocaust as history, Bernstein introduces "history" into 
two chapters he spends misreading the fiction of Aharon Appelfeld. Appel-
feld's novel Badenheim 1939 portrays a group of assimilated middle-class 
Austro-German Jews existing aimlessly in a resort town, apparently as the 
final stage of the German genocide against the Jews is about to commence. 
The characters are in a state of deep denial of the realities surrounding them, 
and they either refuse to, or cannot, acknowledge the ominous signals of dis-
aster that constantly bombard their senses. As has often been pointed out, 
the novel is Kafkaesque, surrealistic, poetic, allegorical, but Bernstein is mor-
ally outraged both by the historical inaccuracy of the novel and by what he 
takes to be Appelfeld's unfair hit on Austro-German Jews. 
"The behavior of the vacationers in Badenheim," Bernstein writes, "is not 
just self-deceiving; it is also largely Appelfeld's own fantasy, belied by the 
pervasive terror that gripped Austrian Jewry within hours of the A11schluss" 
(66). Bernstein's asssertion is so absurd it relutes iself. What does he think 
"the behavior" of the characters in any \\fork of fiction is if not the "fantasy" 
of the writer, \vhether that "fantasy" is presented as "realism" or allegory? 
How can events "belie" a text which does not claim to be a chronicle of 
events in the first place? But at any rate, as we shall see, he is not even cor-
rect in his characterization of the affective center of the novel. 
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Bernstein's inability to apprehend the affective center of the novel leads 
him to accuse Appelfeld of blaming Austro-German Jews for their own de-
struction, an accusation that exposes not only Bernstein's ineptitude as a 
reader but his simplistic understanding of the Holocaust. The gist of Bern-
stein's argument is that the reader, who realizes these decadent assimilated 
Jews are about to be enveloped by the Nazi genocide while they do not, is 
led by the narrator (Appelfeld himself?) to pass the most severe judgment on 
the Jewish characters in the novel, and therefore on actual Austro-German 
Jews. "By never mentioning the Nazis directly, but by representing the Jews 
of Badenheim as irredeemably selfish and petty:' Bernstein concludes, Ap-
pelfeld " ... commits the ... offense of leaving unchallenged the monstrous 
proposition that Europe's Jews are somehow 'deserving' of punishment" 
(66). 
It is difficult to pinpoint "this monstrous proposition," which Bernstein at-
tributes to the fact that Appelfeld writes in the vein of foreshadowing rather 
than sideshadowing, anywhere in the novel. Certainly, it is not a proposition 
ever stated in the novel, or by Appelfeld himself outside the novel. And 
even if it were accurate to suggest that the Nazis don't playa significant role 
in the novel because they are never "mentioned directly," I believe a reason-
able reader uncommitted to a narrow theory of "sideshadowing" would not 
infer from the novel the moral that "Europe's Jews" deserved to be extermi-
nated. Even supposing a completely naive reader unable to distinguish be-
tween JlEurope's Jews" and Badenheim's Jews, what scale of justice would 
that reader have to use to arrive at the conclusion that average human 
beings guilty of nothing worse than lack of foreSight and inability to act de-
cisively "are deserving" of being exterminated like vermin? 
Bernstein has arrived at this bizarre conclusion by taking over the observa-
tion of earlier commentators that the reader does not see any Nazis por-
trayed directly, and then extending that observation to mean that since we 
read only about Jews in the novel, they must be to blame for their own de-
struction. Hence, he concludes that " ... it is difficult not to include the au-
thor of Badenheim 1939 ... among those 'prominent Jews' ... [alluded to by 
Appelfeld in an interview with Philip Roth] who make 'harsh comments' 
about the victims of the Shoah. Even the most assimilated and self-denying 
Jews were still sufficiently Jewish to be murdered, and so the contempt of a 
novel like Badenheim 1939 is just as 'anti-Semitic' in its attribution of complic-
ity as are the harshest judgments of the unnamed 'prominent Jews' " (72). 
But the "contempt" for the Jewish characters in Badenheim 1939 resides in 
Bernstein's own heart, not in Appelfeld's novel. And the charge that the Jews 
were complicitous in their own destruction is Bernstein's, not Appelfeld's. 
Bernstein can find contempt in the novel only because he knows very little 
about Holocaust literature, and because he does not have a clue to under-
standing survivor sensibility. In an essay entitled, "A Plea for the Dead:' in 
Legends of Our Time, Elie Wiesel has written, "[ plead for the dead, and [ do 
not say they are innocent; that is neither my intention nor aim. I say simply 
we have no right to judge them; to confer innocence upon them is already to 
judge them. I saw them die and if I feel the need to speak of gUilt, it is al-
ways of my own that I speak. I saw them go away and I remained behind. 
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Often I do not forgive myself for that." It is exactly this survivor sensibility 
that motivates Appelfeld, a sensibility Bernstein does not comprehend. 
Badenheim 1939, then, is far from being an "anti-Semitic" novel. The Jewish 
characters portrayed by Appelfeld are pathetic, and perhaps tragic, but cer-
tainly not contemptible to any reader who understands the novel. The narra-
tor makes clear that these characters do not belong to the top echelon of as-
similated Austro-Gennan Jews (the Warburgs, for example); they are, rather, 
people in comfortable circumstances, but not the wealthiest and most power-
ful German Jews. The spa at Badenheim is clearly a second-rate place that 
does not attract the elite, even in the assimilated Jewish population. This 
much is apparent in Appelfeld's portrayal of the impresario, Dr. Pappen-
heim, and in the fact that the entertainment at Badenheim is second rate be-
cause top performers won't come there. The pervasive tone of the novel is 
not contempt but terror, the terror of people trapped like animals sensing 
they are being led to the slaughter, but not knowing what they can do to 
avert the catastrophe they feel is coming. If Bernstein had been able to get 
beyond his theory he would have seen that Appelfeld portrays with great 
artistry what Bernstein himself has described as "the pervasive terror that 
gripped Austrian Jewry within hours of the Anschluss." Their consciousness 
of being trapped, and the ensuing terror, begins to influence the behavior of 
the vacationing Jews, as should be apparent to any sensitive reader. They are 
not angels to begin with, only humans. That is exactly Appelfeld's point. But 
they don't deserve to be exterminated just for being human, and they de-
scend into a deeper aimlessness and decadence as they begin to sniff their 
own powerlessness and impending anniliilation. 
Appelfeld's not mentioning Nazis directly is testimony to his brilliance as 
a novelist, not the moral blemish that Bernstein contends. If it is true that 
Nazis are not mentioned, it is also true that Germans and German bureau-
cracy are a pervasive presence in the novel. For some unknown, and there-
fore ominous, reason, all Jews are required to register with the Sanitation 
Department. A shadowy Sanltation Department inspector is ubiquitous in 
the novel, and his presence, while mild, nevertheless strikes fear into the 
hearts of the Jews. All the inhabitants, vacationers, and performers in Baden-
heim are stained with some kind of physical or neurotic illness, and we are 
led to infer that the sickness and decadence are somehow related to a Euro-
pean, and perhaps specifically German, high culture that provides no deter-
rent to the coming destruction. Appelfeld has captured to perfection the 
chilling contrast between the serene relentlessness of the bureaucratic killing 
process and the paralyzing terror of the victims. 
A fly leaf following the title page of Foregone Conclusions identifies the vol-
ume as n A Centennlal Book," one of a hundred to be "published between 
1990 and 1995 ... as an example for the Press's finest publishing and book-
making traditions." While this is indeed a beautifully made book with a very 
handsome dust cover, it is, ironically, a book so puerile in its theorizing, so 
shoddy in its scholarship, so inept as literary commentary, so blatantly in-
sensitive in its handling of moral and ethical questions, and so misleading in 
its oversimplification of complex issues, that it reflects shame not only on its 
author, but on the Press and on the editors of the series in which it is a vol-
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ume, "Contraversions: Critical Studies in Jewish Literature, Culture, and So-
ciety." 
Brown University David H. Hirsch 
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